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Servant leadership has been seen as being a weak style of leadership by 
some, unsuitable for such high risk and dangerous professions as the 
military. This paper shows that the servant leadership style has been used 
to great effect in at least one historical example. It explores examples of 
servant leadership through the military career of Evans Carlson, former 
army officer and founder of the Marine Corps’ 2nd Raider Battalion. It 
also compares Carlson’s Gung Ho leadership philosophy with servant 
leadership and makes the case for the adoption of servant leadership by 
the military, due to the successful implementation of Gung Ho in the 2nd 
Raider Battalion. Finally, it examines the impacts that Gung Ho and 
servant leadership had on the 2nd Raider Battalion and the legacy of the 
battalion in the modern military. 
Keywords: Transformational Leadership, Servant Leadership, 
Transactional Leadership  
 
1942 started off as a terrible year for the United States. A surprise attack in December 
1941 left the Pacific Fleet crippled and unable to check the Japanese Empire’s advances. 
The US Army in the Philippines retreated in the face of the enemy. Manila was surrendered 
without a fight and US and Filipino forces fell back to the Bataan Peninsula. A Marine 
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Corps garrison on Wake Island was surrounded and captured. US morale plummeted in the 
face of such losses. A victory was needed to rally flagging spirits. 
In February 1942, key leaders in the US Navy and Marine Corps, spurred by President 
Roosevelt, proposed the idea of a hit and run type force, modeled in part on the commandos 
of Great Britain’s armed forces. Two battalions were soon formed, the 1st and 2nd Raider 
Battalions. Lieutenant Colonel Evans Carlson, an early and vocal proponent of the Raider 
concept, took command of the 2nd Raider Battalion (Hoffman, 1995). 
Carlson took an unorthodox approach to his command. Instead of following strict 
military discipline and hierarchy, he implemented a more egalitarian approach to leading 
his Marines. Calling his style “Gung Ho” leadership, derived from a Chinese phrase 
meaning “work together” that he picked up while an observer attached to communist 
guerrillas in China’s Civil War. Gung Ho leadership displayed the key attributes of what 
today would be called servant leadership. Servant leadership is defined as “an 
understanding and practice of leadership that places the good of those led over the self-
interest of the leader” (Laub, 2004, p. 8). Furthermore, it “promotes the valuing and 
development of people, the building of community, the practice of authenticity, the 
providing of leadership for the good of those led and the sharing of power and status for 
the common good of each individual, the total organization and those served by the 
organization” (Laub, 2004, p. 8). Like the modern theory of servant leadership, Gung Ho 
meant that leaders were first among equals, receiving no special benefits for their increased 
responsibilities, beyond additional pay (van Dierendonck, 2011). Servant leaders also 
display a certain set of characteristics, listed below, that Gung Ho sought to instill in all 
levels of leadership.  
This paper seeks to show that what Evans Carlson’s leadership style was similar to 
servant leadership, that his Raider Battalion and those influenced by demonstrate servant 
leadership as a viable option for some military operations, and that servant leadership 
allowed the 2nd Raider Battalion to have far reaching effects on the US population, the 
Japanese Empire, and on the Marines who served in the battalion. For the purposes of this 
paper, Lieutenant Colonel Evans Carlson will be the main leader in focus. The people he 
develops are the Marine Raiders, both under his direct command and influenced by his 
leadership. The organization will be both the Raider Battalions and the Marine Corps, and 
those served by the organization will be the United States population. 
To further demonstrate that Carlson was a servant leader, his actions will be compared 
to the characteristics identified by van Dierendonck (2011) to be those of a servant leader. 
These six characteristics are: 1) empowering and developing people: creating a sense of 
self confidence and giving followers the ability to make decisions; 2) humility: putting 
accomplishments in the proper perspective, while also giving credit where it is due; 3) 
authenticity: acting in accordance with one’s true self or following a personal moral code; 
4) interpersonal acceptance: the ability to understand the feelings of others and where they 
are coming from; 5) providing direction: letting subordinates know what is expected of 
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them; and 6) stewardship: taking responsibility for the larger institution and willing to put 
its needs above self-interests (van Dierendonck, 2011).  
The value of this paper is that it seeks to answer some of the criticism currently leveled 
against servant leadership. Some have either accused servant leadership of being too weak 
for the military or listed traits for successful military leaders that seem incompatible with 
servant leadership (Wong, 2007; Campbell, Hannah, & Matthews, 2010: Laurence, 2011). 
This paper will show that servant leadership can be used effectively in a military setting. 
Not only is it an effective style for the military, but instead of stifling risk taking and the 
initiative, it promoted it. 
Carlson’s Early Military Career 
In order to fully understand Carlson’s leadership during his time as commander of 
2nd Raider Battalion, it is necessary to examine his military career. Carlson originally 
joined the Army at the age of 16 by lying to the recruiter and saying he was 22. Branching 
into the field artillery, Carlson quickly learned about self-discipline and soldiering by 
observing his company mates and learning from their mistakes. During the course of his 
three year enlistment, Carlson quickly rose to the rank of Assistant Sergeant Major, 
traveled to various sites in the Pacific, and took multiple correspondence and local courses 
to improve his education (Blankfort, 1947). This initial enlistment taught him much about 
the military, about the importance of authenticity, and gave him his first major chance to 
learn how to lead others. Though his active duty enlistment was over, he was still subject 
to mobilization in times of national crisis. 
Carlson then worked a variety of jobs and got married after settling down in a small 
Californian town. However, tensions with Mexico soon brought him back into service as 
the Army Reserves were called up in 1916. Carlson became an artillery instructor to 
activated National Guardsmen. While teaching these citizen soldiers, he discovered a few 
key principles of leadership. He found that he could get his batteries to perform better when 
they knew why they were doing something instead of just knowing how to do it (Blankfort, 
1947). Additionally, he began to realize that even soldiers had an idea of independence that 
balked at the thought of bending to power (Blankfort, 1947). Carlson was beginning to 
grasp the idea inherent to servant leadership, that one must lead by example, and not only 
through power (Hunter, 2004). 
In 1917, Carlson was given the opportunity to practice leadership on a grander scale. 
He was promoted to 1st lieutenant and then captain in quick succession. He led larger 
groups of men. More importantly, he understood certain ideals of leadership, such as 
having love for his followers. In a letter to his father, Carlson wrote, “I love my men but 
must keep them working… I must always see they have sufficient food and shelter 
whenever it is possible… I never ask a man to do something I won’t do myself… An officer 
that can mix with his men and show them that he does not hold himself above them… 
always holds their respect and loyalty” (Blankfort, 1947, p. 113).  
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His unit shipped out to France late in 1918 and saw no action in World War One. 
They redeployed to the US in 1919 (Blankfort, 1947). The next few years were hard on 
Carlson. He separated from his wife, bounced from job to job, and lost the zeal he once 
had for life. In 1922, he decided to return to service. He originally thought about reentering 
the army, but since they would only make him a second lieutenant, and thus junior to his 
former colleagues who had not left the service, he enlisted as a private in the Marine Corps 
(Blankfort, 1947). Due to his previous service as an Army captain, he soon made corporal 
and was sent to the predecessor of what is now Officer Candidate School. Here, Carlson 
had to write essays and study a large range of topics. In one essay, he wrote “An 
Interpretation of Military Ethics.” This essay challenged fellow candidates to reevaluate 
their ethical code, and stressed the need for ethics in the military, pointing out that ethics 
are essential to achieving “the welfare of the whole and efficiency of the fighting machine” 
and stressing that officers were “moral agents” (Blankfort, 1947, p. 125). In writing this 
essay, Carlson demonstrated how vital ethical behavior was for leadership and how it 
would improve the overall performance of the organization. 
In the next several years, Carlson transferred from post to post, met his second wife, 
trained, and failed out of flight school. He gained recognition for taking care of his Marines, 
causing Brigadier General Smedley Butler, one of the legends of the Corps, to comment 
on the reason for many to join the Marines being “because [the Marines have] a lot of 
officers like Carlson who take care of their men” (Blankfort, 1947, p. 133). In 1927, 
Carlson and his unit shipped to China to protect American interests. For much of their time, 
they did little besides parading and standing by. Carlson received a promotion to first 
lieutenant and was appointed as a regimental intelligence officer. He worked closely with 
Naval Intelligence officers to learn about China. The most influential of which was 
Admiral Bristol, whose ideas of racial equality and demand for the truth would leave a 
lasting impact on Carlson (Blankfort, 1947). Additionally, while an intelligence officer, 
Carlson published articles designed to educate his men on the history and current political 
situation in China, These articles were so popular, his men and fellow officers asked for 
more when Carlson finished his initial four articles (Blankfort, 1947). His tour ended in 
1929 and he headed back to the States. 
In 1930, Carlson reported to Nicaragua to help with their national guard. Here, he 
would work closely with Nicaraguan soldiers, serving as an officer in their Guardia 
Nacional. Despite another group of soldiers killing a few of their American officers shortly 
before Carlson’s arrival, Carlson knew he had to establish a trusting relationship with the 
soldiers he now led. His first words to his group of Nicaraguans was, in Spanish, “I trust 
you friends. I will see to it that you have food and shelter. It is to the benefit of all of us to 
bring peace and security to your great country” (Blankfort, 1947, p. 159). Knowing that 
the Guardias held the power, not Carlson, he sought to lead by example. This paid off with 
his first taste of combat. Trailing a guerrilla force of 300 men with only 12 of his own, 
Carlson and his soldiers surprised and routed their enemy. His men performed confidently, 
demonstrating esprit de corps and élan, shouting “Viva la Guardia Nacional” as they 
charged forward (Blankfort, 1947, p. 162). This spirit only comes from a well led and 
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confident group. The fact that Carlson’s men demonstrated this was a testament to his 
leadership.  
Carlson returned to the United States in 1933 and was soon on his way to China. 
During his second tour, he tried something radical and new. He taught language and culture 
to the Marines under his command. This had a profound effect. Offenses committed by the 
Marines against the local population plummeted and Carlson learned an important lesson 
in leadership, one that would greatly impact his command of the Raiders. He discovered 
that when subordinates “are given information about the situation in which they act and 
live they derive from it a sense of responsibility” (Blankfort, 1947, p. 169). In 1935, 
Carlson transferred to Washington for presidential service. 
Carlson’s Time with the Guerrillas 
1937 saw Carlson return to China for his third and final tour there. This assignment 
would have a profound impact on Carlson’s leadership ability and further refine what he 
already knew about leading soldiers. He was attached as a military observer to the Chinese 
Eighth Route Army, a communist guerrilla group fighting the Japanese (Carlson, 1940). 
Here he learned a philosophy that he would pass on to his Raiders, “Gung Ho!” Carlson 
heard this phrase, a distortion of the Chinese term for “work together”, while studying the 
techniques of the guerrillas. While in their camps and talking with the men, Carlson was 
reminded of the need to explain the “why” behind a cause to his men. While observing the 
communists indoctrinate new recruits and the population about the reasons they were 
fighting the Japanese, Carlson realized the need for followers to understand why they were 
doing a task, not just how to do a task or that a task had to be done.  
When he asked one of the guerrilla leaders about the lack of outward distinction 
between officers and men, Carlson learned another important lesson. The leader answered, 
“What are officers? … They are leaders. And how do we tell if a man is a leader? He is a 
leader if he has given his men convincing proof of his ability to lead, his correctness and 
swiftness of decision, his courage, his willingness to share everything with his men. If he 
proves all this, then he is respected. His men have confidence in him. But men and their 
leaders are comrades. Off duty, they are on equal social basis. They salute only on duty- 
and only then when they are addressing each other formally for purposes of transacting 
business” (Blankfort, 1947, p. 201-202). This stood in sharp contrast to Carlson’s Marine 
Corps, which featured sharp stratifications both on and off duty between the men and their 
officers. Carlson grasped the importance of this way of thinking immediately, responding, 
“What you do does more than help win battles or inform people as to their condition. 
You’re teaching yourselves and your people how to live like decent human beings… It’s 
ethical indoctrination!” (Blankfort, 1947, p. 202).  
Carlson had found a leadership principle that he was searching for his entire career. 
He soon saw the results of this philosophy. Working with an element of the Eighth Route 
Army,, he traveled 58 miles in 32 hours with 600 men, moving over several mountain tops 
and pursued by Japanese army forces. The men had few chances to rest. During the entire 
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time, the men continued to push forward, kept a cheery demeanor, and had no stragglers. 
Carlson attributed this feat of endurance to the ethical indoctrination the men received. He 
encountered men from the nationalist factions who achieved far less and did not know the 
reasons they fought. (Blankfort, 1947). In comparing the two factions, Carlson decided that 
the egalitarian leadership style demonstrated by the Communists was far superior to the 
autocratic model used by the Nationalists. 
In addition to learning about leadership, Carlson also began to fully realize the 
authenticity of his drive that would help him as a leader. While discussing why he wanted 
to go to the most dangerous areas in China and why he wanted to see the frontline fighting 
that so many other foreigners avoided, Carlson told his Chinese counterparts about the 
rights which Americans enjoyed. “We’ve had a revolution and a civil war for them. In the 
Chinese people, I have seen this same love of liberty and equality, and I am convinced 
from what I have seen that they are ready to sacrifice … so that their children, at least, will 
enjoy these rights… I, as one American, can see how you resist the invader, and make my 
report to the world. The risk is one which any of my countrymen would gladly take” 
(Blankfort, 1947, p. 234). With this, Carlson shows his drive, conviction, and authenticity, 
which, drives his actions in China and is readily seen by those around him. Additionally, it 
shows that he views all people and races as equal, a necessary trait for servant leadership, 
and a fairly radical view in the 1930s. 
Carlson’s authenticity was further demonstrated in his attempted resignation from the 
Marine Corps. After authorizing several reporters to directly quote him on the effectiveness 
of the Chinese guerrillas, the Japanese government pressured the US government to 
censure Carlson, since he was a military officer of a neutral nation acting in a strictly 
observation role. When he received word of this, Carlson decided to resign rather than not 
do what he saw as the right thing to do. Despite being eligible for promotion and retirement, 
which came with a government pension, Carlson turned in his letter of resignation. He 
wished to be free from outside influence to speak the truth as he knew it (Blankfort, 1947). 
After protests from friends and colleagues, Carlson withdrew his resignation (Blankfort, 
1947). However, after the acting secretary of the navy told Carlson that he could only give 
a lecture on current conditions in China to a charity group if he did not include anything 
that he learned while on assignment, Carlson resigned, refusing a pension or reserve 
commission (Blankfort, 1947). He left active duty on April 30, 1939. 
Carlson was soon commissioned to write a book on his experiences in China. In his 
book, Carlson reflects on the leadership philosophy that he witnessed while with the 
guerrillas. He noted that soldiers will be “faithful to the point of death to a leader who treats 
him with consideration” (Carlson, 1940, p. 11). He compares the communists, with their 
ethical indoctrination model and treatment of soldiers as equals, with the nationalists, who 
used an autocratic leadership style, keeping their soldiers ignorant to important 
information, and using a very rank based hierarchy. He writes, “The high efficiency of [the 
nationalist elite units] is not due to any special ideological indoctrination, but to the 
emphasis that is placed on obedience and to the fact that provision is made for their material 
well-being. This is the orthodox manner of building an army and its effectiveness up to a 
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certain point cannot be denied. The men of such an army become automatons without 
spiritual convictions. When the men of such an army are pitted, in a long and arduous war, 
against troops that are fighting for an ideal, the spirit of the latter enables them to better 
endure the strain” (Carlson, 1940, p. 32). Carlson understood that soldiers needed more 
than just discipline to be effective in combat. To be truly capable of anything, soldiers 
needed to be developed, to know why they were fighting. He would soon get a chance to 
enact these ideas with his own unit. 
The 2nd Raider Battalion 
In mid-1941, Carlson reentered the Marine Corps as a major in the reserves. Soon 
called up to active duty, he began proposing the creation of commando type units based on 
guerrilla warfare and the British commando units being used against occupied Europe 
(Blankfort, 1947). The Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, and several 
American territories at the end of 1941. On February 5, 1942, the First Separate Battalion, 
2nd Marine Division, which would become the 2nd Raider Battalion, formed, with Carlson 
in command (Blankfort, 1947). Carlson would have his unit and a chance to implement the 
leadership he learned in China and over his career. 
First came recruitment. The Marine Corps at the time was an all-volunteer force. To 
become a Raider, Marines would have to volunteer again for the hazardous and secretive 
new unit. Carlson used this as an opportunity to ensure that he only received men capable 
of enduring the hardships his battalion would be called on to face. He wanted self-assured 
fighters—men that had no problems killing with a knife or their bare hands. Carlson and 
his officers personally interviewed all potential Raiders, looking for these types of men. 
Carlson took men that others viewed with suspicion, such as American veterans of the 
Spanish Civil War (Jennings, 2001). Like Carlson’s counterpart in the First Raider 
Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Mike Edson, Carlson was allowed to go through nearby 
Marine units and take his pick of officers and men (Walker, 1998). However, the most 
important quality that Carlson looked for was not physical toughness or a desire for action. 
Carlson “wouldn’t take a man that didn’t give a damn about anything”. Instead, he wanted 
men who had “a deep feeling about wanting to fight, even for the wrong reasons” (Smith, 
2001, p. 44). Carlson would teach them the right reasons as necessary. With his battalion 
formed, Carlson proceeded to prepare them for their mission. 
The basis of any successful fighting unit is its training (Headquarters, Department of 
the Army, 2006). Carlson took a somewhat unorthodox approach to training his unit. 
Shortly after forming the battalion, Carlson gathered the Marines, had the group sing the 
national anthem, and then explained how he was going to run the unit (Smith, 2001). He 
explained the concept of Gung Ho that he learned in China, explained his vision of equality 
between officers and men, and then outlined the basics of his ethical indoctrination concept. 
This was in stark contrast to many other American units, which were highly stratified by 
rank. These other units also tended to view their soldiers as cogs in a machine, a means to 
an end, whereas Carlson viewed them as individuals, full of potential and intelligence. 
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This talk formed the basis of the Gung Ho sessions that would continue throughout 
training. Once a week, the battalion would gather together and talk over several topics. 
Foremost in these discussions was always the performance of the unit in training exercises. 
Everyone was encouraged to speak up and explain what had happened from their point of 
view. Criticism, even of higher ranks, was encouraged (Smith, 2001). If the lowest ranking 
Marines saw a better way of doing an operation, he was not only allowed, but expected to 
stand up in front of the battalion and explain his way of doing things, and then others were 
allowed to challenge that Marine with their ideas. This gave his Marines unprecedented 
interaction with their leadership and allowed them to have a say in what happened with 
their unit. 
Also at these Gung Ho sessions were lectures and guest speakers, including the First 
Lady, Eleanor Roosevelt. The Marines discussed a wide variety of issues, ranging from 
social issues, such as limiting income after the war, to history and treatment of the South 
during Reconstruction (Smith, 2001). Carlson’s reasoning behind all of this was simple. 
Encouraging thinking during training, no matter what the topic, would encourage thinking 
during combat. This would lead to taking the initiative, to taking advantage of any opening 
that a Marine found in battle (Wukovits, 2009).  
In addition to explaining why and how things were going to work in his battalion, 
Carlson ran tough, realistic training. The basics to this training mirrored many other 
specialty units of the time. Marksmanship and hand to hand fighting were stressed, just as 
they were in the commando units that the Raiders were partially based on (Ladd, 1978). 
Carlson though gave his men no expectations of luxury. Where other units had barracks to 
live in during training, Carlson acclimated his men to the field conditions they would face 
in combat by having them live in tents (Smith, 2001). 
These harsh conditions came with tough discipline. Unlike the 1st Raider Battalion 
who got regular passes and leave, Carlson refused passes to his men, and would even 
discourage men from taking emergency leave to visit sick relatives (Blankfort, 1947). 
There are few sources that document the disciplinary actions of the battalion, but the 
inference can be made that Carlson enforced stricter discipline than most other Marine 
units. He set his battalion away from civilization, to remove the temptations and discipline 
infractions that come with intermingling with civilians, and held formations in the middle 
of the night to try and catch anyone who tried to go absent without leave (Hoffman, 1995). 
There were several additions to the standard specialty training that made the 2nd 
Raiders stand out. Carlson pushed his men on forced marches that would sometimes go for 
70 miles, gave his men no time off or passes to visit local towns, and had his men build the 
training areas they would use (Smith, 2001). Officers and men still continued to work side 
by side, officers receiving no distinction or special treatment because of their rank (Wiles, 
2007). Carlson himself set the pace for the marches, causing some of his men, all of whom 
were much younger than him, to fall out (Wukovits, 2009). He only allowed his men to eat 
what they could forage on the march. He intended to toughen them up as much as he could, 
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so that they would be ready for combat. It worked. The officers and Marines of the battalion 
felt that they were well prepared and could take on anything. 
The battalion would soon get the chance to face the enemy. Carlson had to briefly 
leave the unit to meet with higher headquarters and discuss upcoming operations. While 
he was gone, his second in command carried out amphibious landing training with the 
battalion. Despite the absence of the commanding officer, the junior leaders of the battalion 
had been trained and drilled enough that the exercises went off without incident (Wukovits, 
2009). The 2nd Raider Battalion was moved to Hawaii in preparation for more training and 
to forward stage the battalion for operations in the Pacific. 
After months of training and preparing, the Raiders received their first mission. They 
were to raid Makin Atoll, destroy the flying boat base there, capture prisoners, and score a 
victory to raise the US home front’s morale (Wukovits, 2009). After rehearsing landing on 
beaches built to look like the atoll for several weeks, Carlson and his Marines headed out 
on submarines. They landed on the beach in the early hours of 17 August, 1942. From the 
moment their boats launched off of the submarines, there was confusion. Boats landed at 
the wrong sites, groups intermixed, and chaos reigned. Japanese forces found the group 
and firefights soon raged in the jungles. At one point, Carlson attempted to evacuate his 
Marines from the island and even contemplated surrendering to the Japanese (Wiles, 2007). 
However, the decentralized nature of the battalion saved the day. Small groups of Raiders 
continued on to their objectives, wiping out groups of enemy infantry that far outnumbered 
them (Roosevelt, 1942). Junior leaders took charge and rallied their men, securing a 
foothold on the atoll, and buying time and space for the battalion to consolidate and finish 
its mission. Ultimately, the mission killed the entire Japanese garrison, destroyed several 
major facilities, burned critical war material, and achieved a needed victory (Smith, 2001). 
The training had paid off. The Raiders had demonstrated that their style of training could 
work. 
The battalion was soon back in combat at Guadalcanal. They landed away from other 
Marine elements on 6 November, 1942. For the next month, Carlson and his Raiders 
patrolled through the jungle, disrupting Japanese forces, determining accurate enemy 
positions, and scouting for a suitable site for an airfield (Smith, 2001). Throughout their 
month long movement through the jungle, during which time the Raiders suffered from 
lack of food and from numerous jungle maladies, the battalion encountered numerous 
Japanese forces. By the end of the patrol, they had killed 500 of the enemy, with a loss of 
only 16 dead and 18 wounded (Shaw, 1992). They also helped relieve pressure off of the 
First Marine Division and bought additional time for reinforcements to be brought onto the 
island. 
However, despite the success of the patrol and the earlier Makin Atoll raid, the Gung 
Ho concept was to be short lived. The Marines raised two more battalions of Raiders, 
reorganized them into two regiments and appointed Carlson as second in command of the 
First Raider Regiment. The officer who replaced Carlson restructured the battalion to the 
standard Marine organization and got rid of all the tenets of Carlson’s Gung Ho philosophy 
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(Forty, 2006). Gung Ho did live on in the 4th Raider Battalion under James Roosevelt, who 
had been Carlson’s second in command through the standing up of the 2nd battalion until 
shortly after the Guadalcanal campaign (Smith, 2001). In early 1944, the Marines 
disbanded all Raider units and reformed the men into conventional Marine units (Ladd, 
1978). The 2nd Raider Battalion was disbanded entirely, its members scattered throughout 
the Marine Corps and a select few stayed together to form the regimental weapons 
company for the new 4th Marine Regiment. The other Raider battalions became 
conventional Marine battalions in the 4th Marine Regiment (Forty, 2006). 
Impact of the Raiders 
Carlson retired from the Marine Corps in 1946 as a brigadier general, never having 
the chance to command a unit after his Raider battalion. Despite only being in a direct 
leadership role for about a year, he made a huge impact on the Marine Corps and his men. 
During the short time Raider battalions were part of the Marine Corps, there were 8000 
Marines that were assigned to the four battalions. Two of those battalions used the Gung 
Ho philosophy—the 2nd under the direct leadership of Evans Carson and the 4th under his 
former second in command, James Roosevelt. (Smith, 2001). One way to measure how 
individuals take charge and act under fire, a key component of Raider training, is through 
the awarding of medals. In World War Two, eight percent of the Medals of Honor, 12 
percent of the Navy Crosses, the second highest award for valor, and eight percent of the 
silver stars, the third highest award for valor, awarded to Marines were given to men who 
had been part of the Raider battalions (Jennings, 2001). By contrast, the Marine Corps had 
a peak strength of about 500,000 during the war, meaning the Raiders only made up less 
than two percent of the overall strength (Fuentes, 2011). Additionally, Carlson’s battalion 
was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation, the highest award an entire unit can receive, 
for its actions at Guadalcanal, further demonstrating the effectiveness of their leadership 
style (Smith, 2001). 
Another indicator of the success of a military leadership style, besides how well 
soldiers perform in battle, is how badly they are affected by battle. Looking at the number 
of personnel incapacitated by battle fatigue or post-traumatic stress disorder gives a good 
indication to how well their leadership prepared them for battle (Grossman & Christensen 
2008). For Guadalcanal, a campaign noted for its brutality and austere living conditions, 
for close in jungle fighting, numerous diseases and lack of food, approximately 40% of all 
casualties, about 2525 men, were psychological casualties that had to be evacuated 
(Marlowe, 2000). By contrast, the 2nd Raider Battalion, suffered no psychological 
casualties, despite the fact that during their 30 day patrol they were in repeated combat 
with the enemy, suffered from frequent food and ammunition shortages, and suffered just 
as many jungle maladies as the other units fighting at Guadalcanal (Smith, 2001). This is 
likely because of the group cohesion and esprit de corps of the 2nd Raiders, which was 
encouraged by the shared hardships amongst all members, and the Gung Ho sessions which 
encouraged a sense of equality in the battalion. Units that demonstrated high cohesion and 
felt a bond with their commanders were shown to have a much lower rate of psychological 
casualties than units that did not during World War Two (Pols & Oak, 2007). 
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One of Carlson’s innovations was his implementation of the fire team at the squad 
level. This created a smaller unit than was previously seen in the military and allowed his 
formation not only greater tactical flexibility, but also allowed them greater initiative in 
their actions. After the disbandment of the Raiders, Carlson’s Marines were sent 
throughout the Marine Corps. They took with them the innovations and ideas that they 
learned under his command. Among those ideas was the fire team. Carlson received letters 
from his former subordinates thanking him for the tactic and informing him of their use of 
the fire team to save lives and exercise greater initiative in their new units (Blankfort, 
1947). Prior to Carlson’s implementation of fire teams, the squad was the lowest level of 
organization for Marine riflemen. Leadership consisted of a sergeant and his assistant, a 
corporal, leading a 9 man organization (Forty, 2006). Carlson divided the nine man squads 
into three man fire teams, where the most capable junior Marines, regardless of rank, were 
given leadership positions (Gomrick, 1999). The nine man squads were designed for a more 
rigid system of control and was a holdover from the battlefields of World War One.  
The Corps wide adoption of fire teams, which came about after the Raiders were 
disbanded and the men of the 2nd Raiders were sent to other units, bringing with them the 
fire team concept, allowed for greater flexibility. Squads were then divided into three four-
man fire teams, each lead by a corporal. Additionally, each fire team gained an automatic 
weapon, whereas before, automatics were centralized at the platoon level (Forty, 2006). 
This new system empowered lower leaders to be able to make quicker tactical decisions in 
combat, by decentralizing control to a lower lever and by allowing more men to become 
non-commissioned officers. It also helped train junior leaders for greater leadership roles, 
giving the unit a pool of men who had some experience and could later take on squad leader 
and higher positions. It also gave new recruits a tight knit group that would train them up 
and look after them upon their arrival to a unit (Wukovits, 2009). 
Another systematic decentralization enacted by Carlson was the breakdown of 
weapons companies into weapons platoons. Prior to 1942, the majority of the heavy 
weapons in a Marine battalion, such as mortars and machine guns, were consolidated in a 
weapons company (Forty, 2006). This meant that the use of these important weapons was 
decided by the battalion commander. He would determine how to distribute the weapons 
for a given mission and decide where to concentrate them. This produced tactical rigidity 
and made it difficult for lower level commanders to exercise initiative. It also meant 
vulnerability during landing operations, because companies were grouped together on 
landing craft. Thus, if a weapons company landing craft was sunk on approach to a beach, 
there was a high likelihood of losing multiple heavy weapons, versus if a rifle company 
landing craft were sunk. Carlson secured more heavy weapons for his battalion, then 
divided them across the battalion, creating more robust weapons platoons at the company 
level and getting rid of a battalion weapons company (Ladd, 1978). This caught on for the 
Corps at large and by the end of the war, only scarce and heavier weapons, such as 81mm 
mortars, were consolidated above the rifle company level.  
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Besides changing battalion organization to gain tactical flexibility and promoting 
junior level leadership, Carlson’s leadership left one more legacy that impacts the entire 
US military to this day. In the Gung Ho sessions, Raiders were encouraged to point out 
mistakes or issues and were allowed to make recommendations for improvement, no matter 
their rank (Wukovits, 2009). This honesty from all ranks, without fear of reprisal, and with 
the expectation that all men leave their egos behind, was unheard of in the military at the 
time. However, throughout the years, this idea has morphed into the concept of the after 
action review, a common technique used by the military after a training exercise 
(Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1993). In an after action review, all participants 
in the exercise, including privates, gather around, talk about what was supposed to happen, 
what did happen, and how to improve. This allows for the lower ranks to give input and 
have a say in how their organization runs, similar to the Gung Ho sessions held by Carlson 
in his battalion. 
Gung Ho and Servant Leadership 
In comparing the practice of Gung Ho leadership to the definition of servant 
leadership proposed by Laub (2004), several similarities become readily apparent. The 
work together mentality of Gung Ho meant that everyone was seen as equal. Yes, officers 
and noncommissioned officers had extra responsibilities, but they did not receive 
additional benefits beyond pay. They set the example, pushed themselves and others on 
training exercises, and led the way in combat. Leaders were expected to give up the 
material benefits they received in other organizations, such as preferential treatment and 
separate mess facilities. This ties back to the idea of first amongst equals, where servant 
leaders are expected to persuade others through action instead of compulsion (van 
Dierendonck, 2011). Comparing Laub’s (2004) extended definition to Gung Ho shows 
even more similarities. Gung Ho, like servant leadership, promoted the development of 
people through hard training that would help save lives in combat. It created an immense 
feeling of community, as evident by the high morale shown by the unit throughout its life 
span and by the bonding of the men during their training. They developed esprit de corps, 
the intangible military sense that one’s unit is better than any that can be found. They also 
developed authenticity. Carlson set the example, as he was known to firmly believe in the 
concept of Gung Ho and had conviction that the battalion was improving men who would 
become better citizens upon their return home. The men took his example and attempted 
to follow it as best they could (Wukovits, 2009). 
Power was readily shared in the 2nd Raider Battalion. This was evidenced by both the 
Gung Ho sessions and the reorganization of squads into fire teams and the disbandment of 
weapons companies in favor of platoons. Gung Ho sessions took the power of making 
changes and expressing grievances and gave it to all ranks in the battalion, ensuring that 
the lowest level private could have his voice heard by Carlson himself. The reorganization 
of the unit into smaller, more self-sufficient units, decentralized tactical power and put it 
in the hands of those who would make contact with the enemy. It gave them the additional 
benefit of being able to more rapidly react to battlefield conditions. This helped the 
individual Raiders in that it increased their ability to survive on the battlefield. The 
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battalion benefited because it suffered less casualties and was able to inflict more casualties 
on the enemy, thereby increasing its morale. The people of the United States, those 
ultimately served by the 2nd Raider Battalion, also benefited through reduced casualties 
and because Carlson and his men were able to achieve much needed victories at a lower 
cost in lives, which served to revive flagging morale. 
Carlson demonstrates all six of the characteristics of a servant leader that van 
Dierendonck describes (2011). He empowered and developed his subordinates, through his 
Gung Ho sessions and through his decentralization of combat power. His men had a say as 
to how missions were conducted and were allowed to give input that could lead to altering 
the attack plan (Farlow, 1977). His fire teams gave squad leaders more fire power and the 
flexibility to make quick decisions on the battlefield. His reinforcement of company 
weapons platoons and removal of a weapons company from the battalion level gave his 
subordinate commanders the flexibility needed to adapt to battlefield conditions and the 
ability to make crucial firepower decisions at their level, without needing approval from 
Carlson. Furthermore, the Raiders developed a self-confident air about them. They felt like 
they could take on the world. This confidence is one of the key goals of servant leadership 
(van Dierendonck, 2011). 
Carlson was seen as an authentic leader. He truly believed in his mission and what he 
was trying to do with his battalion. Furthermore, his men believed he was authentic as well. 
He delivered exactly what he promised and made no attempts to promise anything he could 
not give his men, which is necessary for authenticity. He promised hardship, then shared 
in that hardship (Wukovits, 2009). Perhaps the most striking way that Carlson 
demonstrated authenticity was the fact that he and his fellow officers did not wear rank. 
They focused instead on building their relationships with their men as opposed to making 
a big deal over the stratifications of rank. This is one of the best ways to demonstrate 
authenticity in an organizational perspective (van Dierendonck, 2011). 
Interpersonal acceptance is defined as being able to understand how other people 
think and why they have their perspectives (van Dierendonck, 2011). While Carlson 
definitely showed this as commander of the 2nd Raider Battalion, his ability for 
interpersonal acceptance is best demonstrated by his time with the communist guerrillas in 
China. While working with the guerrillas, Carlson was able to see things from their point 
of view. At a time when America was divided by racial prejudices and feelings of Anglo 
superiority towards other ethnicities, Carlson felt that the communist guerrillas were the 
modern day equivalent of American revolutionary patriots (Blankfort, 1947). By the time 
he became the commander of his battalion, this ability to see things from another’s 
perspective had become so ingrained in his personality that it is difficult to pick out specific 
instances. 
Providing direction for subordinates comes with being a commander of a unit. 
However, as demonstrated by the Chinese Nationalist faction, it is very easy to just tell a 
unit where to go and who to fight, without giving them the reasons for their cause. Through 
his use of Gung Ho sessions, where he outlined why the war started and what they would 
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be expected to do, Carlson avoided the issues he saw in China. He made sure that all his 
men fully understood what was going on and why they were doing it. This helped motivate 
men on long marches, through intense physical activity, and helped contribute to the lack 
of psychological casualties on Guadalcanal (Gomrick, 1999). 
Seeking to serve the greater good instead of trying to retain control or serving self-
interest is the act of stewardship (van Dierendonck, 2011). Carlson demonstrated this in 
several ways. The most visible is his resignation from the Marine Corps in order to be able 
to write about China freely, without interference from the government (Blankfort, 1947). 
He felt he had a responsibility to help the Chinese in their fight against both the Japanese 
and oppression at home. After being reprimanded for letting reporters attribute quotes to 
him, Carlson resigned in order to be able to speak freely to American support groups. This 
allowed him to gather support for a cause he viewed as just. A later example was in how 
he organized his battalion. By decentralizing key weapons through expanding weapons 
platoons and by pushing down leadership and decision making to the lowest level through 
fire teams, Carlson gave up a lot of control that other Marine commanders retained. 
Humility is perhaps Carlson’s most contested trait as a servant leader. In 1943, 
Universal Pictures made a movie about the battalion’s exploits, changing a few details, but 
leaving in many facts about the recruitment process and training of the 2nd Raider Battalion 
(Walter, 1943). Carlson served as a technical advisor for the film. This, combined with the 
media coverage achieved by the battalion after their long patrol at Guadalcanal, led many 
in the Marines to call for the disbandment of Carlson’s battalion (Smith, 2001). Old 
detractors also brought up Carlson’s earlier controversies that led to his resignation before 
the war. However, there are two parts to servant leadership’s definition of humility. The 
first is the ability to put personal accomplishments and talents in proper perspective (van 
Dierendonck, 2011). Part of the Raider’s mission was to achieve victory to help home front 
morale. The US people craved tales of danger and stories of men going behind the lines to 
hit the Japanese on what was seen as their home turf, the jungle. By highlighting the 
exploits of his battalion, Carlson achieved that goal. Perhaps he could have framed his 
battalion’s deeds in the context of the Marine Corps as a whole, but it is difficult to say 
why he did not. The second component of humility is that leaders accept that they can learn 
from others (van Dierendonck, 2011). Carlson fulfills this part of the definition with ease. 
Dating back to the time he first enlisted in the army, Carlson was continuously learning 
from others, attempting to improve his leadership style. His entire time in China further 
displays this. Finally, his Gung Ho sessions were nothing if not ways for him to learn from 
his Marines. 
Research Limitations 
There are some limitations to this paper that further research could help clarify. The 
first is the statistics of valor medals for former Raiders. The best statistics currently 
available show all four battalions consolidated for the amount of medals won. Further 
research would need to contact the Marine Corps’ historical division to attempt to break 
down the statistics further and determine which battalions the former Raiders were a part 
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of before they won their medals. If it shows that the majority of Raider medals were won 
by members of the 2nd and 4th battalions, this would strengthen the claim that Gung Ho 
leadership helps reinforce individual initiative and valor in combat. 
Research into disciplinary measures of the 2nd Raider Battalion might be another area 
for further research. Military units of all types are expected to police their own ranks and 
punish those that do not follow military rules and orders. This is to ensure strict obedience 
to orders and to make sure men will do as they are told in combat. Carlson seemed to turn 
this on its head with his insistence on creating thinking men. At the same time, however, 
Carlson seems to have enforced strict disciplinary measures with the denial of passes and 
leave and holding middle of the night formations to check to ensure no one had left camp 
without permission. This was harsher than what was practiced in the 1st Raider Battalion 
(Hoffman, 1995). Study into this would be able to look at how servant leadership practicing 
organizations police themselves. 
Another area where further research would be helpful would be to determine the 
amount of psychological casualties suffered by the 1st Raider Battalion, a battalion run 
along strict hierarchical lines with distinct rank differences amongst officers and enlisted, 
on Guadalcanal. If the 1st Raider Battalion suffered many more psychological casualties 
than the 2nd, then it would appear that the differences in leadership styles affected the 
psychological well-being of the unit’s members. It would also be helpful to research the 
4th Raider Battalion and see how that unit fared in combat, since it was run with a similar 
philosophy to the 2nd Raider Battalion. 
It would also be helpful to compare the 2nd Raider Battalion to other elite units, either 
its sister Raider battalions or similar units in the Marine Corps, such as the Marine 
Parachute Regiment. This would help determine how much of the 2nd Raider Battalion’s 
successes were due to its unique leadership style and how much was due to the fact that it 
had highly motivated members that volunteered and saw themselves as elite. If other 
formations achieved similar levels of success in terms of avoiding psychological casualties 
and earning valor awards, then success may be attributed more to the highly trained 
volunteers than to any leadership style. It is recommended that the comparison be limited 
to other Marine elite units, as this will eliminate many of the differences between the men 
who volunteered for the units. This is because all men will have been twice volunteers 
(once for the Marines, then again for the elite unit), the training differences will be 
minimalized, they will have fought against a similar enemy, since all Marine elite units 
fought in the Pacific, and they will have the same service standard for awarding medals. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Gung Ho seems to be a military name for a concept very similar to, though not 
synonymous with, servant leadership. As demonstrated in the 2nd Raider Battalion and 
later by the Marines who had once been a part of the battalion, Gung Ho leaders sought to 
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share the same burdens as their subordinates and set the example by personal 
demonstration. This is known as the concept of “first among equals” in servant leadership 
(van Dierendonck, 2011). Just as Laub (2004) would write about servant leadership 
building a sense of community, so too would Gung Ho create a feeling of unity in the 2nd 
Raider Battalion. The Raiders felt they could take on the world, that no force in the world 
could stop them, and that there was no other unit they would rather be a part of. This shared 
sense of community continued long after the unit was disbanded (Jennings, 2001).  
The idea of empowering and developing others was built into the very structure of the 
battalion through the fire teams and company weapons platoons. The Gung Ho sessions 
held by the battalion ensured most of the remaining characteristics of servant leadership. 
Leaders were expected to be authentic and truly believe in the cause they were fighting for 
and to act in accordance with those beliefs, as demonstrated by the multiple sessions where 
they were able to defend their ideas in front of the group. Everyone was expected to listen 
to everyone else at the sessions. The sessions also provided direction to the Raiders by 
explaining what they were expected to do, for the unit and the country. The humility of the 
Gung Ho style is probably best demonstrated in the fact that the battalion was disbanded 
without protest from the Raiders themselves. This demonstrates that they knew they were 
part of a bigger picture in the form of the Marine Corps and that they understood what was 
expected of them as Marines. Finally, stewardship was demonstrated by Gung Ho, not so 
much in a statement, but by one of the main reasons behind its adoption: to prevent needless 
casualties and allow small groups to do more than their numbers alone allowed. 
The success of Carlson and the Gung Ho/servant leadership model provides some 
lessons for today’s military. The first is its effects on mental health. The lack of 
psychological casualties by the battalion on Guadalcanal may be explained by research 
showing that servant leadership helps prevent psychological issues in subordinates (Rivkin, 
2014). However, this is still a relatively new area of research. If further evidence suggests 
this leadership style to be an effective way to prevent psychological issues, then the military 
would benefit from adopting servant leadership as a way of preventing post-traumatic 
stress amongst combat units. Additionally, servant leadership has been shown to increase 
subordinate morale and happiness at work (Carter, 2014; Chen, 2013; Zhou, 2014). This 
would help the military, which has been suffering from lowered morale for several years 
(Seck, 2015). Finally, this case also shows the possibilities of doing more with less in a 
military sense. Through Carlson’s leadership style and decentralization the 2nd Raider 
Battalion, he was able to do the work of bigger formations while having less personnel. 
The military is currently facing large personnel cuts (Simeone, 2014). Being able to do 
more with less personnel, through the effective use of leadership, would allow the military 
to cut back, yet still be able to do the job that once required greater numbers. 
Hopefully, this paper helps to dispel some of the misconceptions of servant leadership 
in the military. Herein are shown the similarities of Gung Ho and servant leadership. Also 
provided, is evidence of the effectiveness of Gung Ho and servant leadership in wartime 
situations. Because of its effective use in these extremely trying situations, servant 
leadership should be considered for use in a peace time military or in future conflicts. 
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